Samir El Khanza
GEM-DIAMOND doctoral fellow
ESR 10 – Socio-economic contestation turned into democratic conflicts? EU comprehensive trade agreements in front of parliaments: the CETA CASE
Samir is a Marie Skłodowska Curie Fellow at Luiss, Laval University and ULB. Passionate about the EU decision-making process and international trade agreements, his research will focus on how contestation can affect the EU’s ability to conclude comprehensive trade agreements.
Host Institutions
Influencing the European trade policy-making process?
National parliaments’ role in the ratification, entry into force and implementation of the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)
Supervisors
- Cristina Fasone
- Richard Ouellet
- Nathalie Brack
Research abstract
In 2016, the “Wallonian Saga” and the constitutional complaint in Germany regarding the compatibility of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with German law associated with an unprecedented mobilization of public opinion, led to widespread protests across several European cities against the signing of CETA. These pivotal events, highlighted by the contentious issue of the agreement's mixity, revealed several structural weaknesses of the European Union’s Common Commercial Policy. In this situation, domestic parliaments were presented with a unique opportunity to assume a central role, catalysing a re-evaluation of their involvement in the negotiations, ratification, and conclusion of EU trade agreements. This thesis aims to examine the underexplored extent to which domestic parliaments can impact the EU’s ability to conclude trade agreements, with a particular focus on the political, legal and democratic concerns raised during the European and Canadian democratic processes involved in the ratification, entry into force and implementation of CETA. Employing a multidisciplinary legal and political comprative analysis, this study evaluates the constitutional and political frameworks in the EU, Belgium, Italy, France, Germany, and Canada, that guide their position on trade policy-making. It also explores how parliamentary contestation paved the way to democratic conflicts within the parliaments and legal systems involved. This research employs doctrinal research and content analysis of legal documents and available data from EU and Canadian institutions, courts, and domestic parliaments, complemented by semi-structured interviews. This thesis sheds light on the role of domestic parliaments in the complex interplay between legal frameworks, parliamentary contestation, and democratic processes in the context of EU trade policy, providing an analysis of the challenges and opportunities presented by mixed trade agreements, like CETA, for domestic parliaments.
Research Question(s)
How and to what extent do domestic parliaments influence the EU's ability to conclude trade agreements?”
Research Hypothesis(es)
1. The stronger the constitutional powers of a national parliament, the greater its capacity to shape or limit the EU’s ability to conclude trade agreements. Because these powers vary across Member States, the extent of parliamentary influence on EU trade policy differs.
2. Greater parliamentary contestation, driven by heightened politicization, perceptions of democratic deficit, legitimacy concerns, and interpretations of the Rule of Law, motivates domestic parliaments to assert their positions in EU trade policy. As a result, they can more strongly shape or constrain the EU’s ability to conclude comprehensive trade agreements.
2. Greater parliamentary contestation, driven by heightened politicization, perceptions of democratic deficit, legitimacy concerns, and interpretations of the Rule of Law, motivates domestic parliaments to assert their positions in EU trade policy. As a result, they can more strongly shape or constrain the EU’s ability to conclude comprehensive trade agreements.
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• Gerring, J., 2017. Qualitative methods. Annual review of political science, 20(1), pp.15-36.Ginsburg, T. The Oxford handbook of comparative foreign relations law. Oxford Handbooks.
• Hall, M.A. and Wright, R.F., 2008. Systematic content analysis of judicial opinions. Calif. L. Rev., 96, p.63.
• Harris, B., 2015. Constitutional law guidebook. Oxford: Oxford University Press. At p.3.
• Hervey, T., Cryer, R., Sokhi-Bulley, B. and Bohm, A., 2011. Research methodologies in EU and international law. Bloomsbury Publishing. At p.28.
• Hofmann, H.C., 2020. Research Frameworks in Comparative Public Law: Law as Category, as Source and as Variable. University of Luxembourg Law Working Paper, (2020-013).
• Hutchinson, T. and Duncan, N., 2012. Defining and describing what we do: doctrinal legal research. Deakin law review, 17(1), pp.83-119.
• Karpen, U., 2012. Comparative law: perspectives of legislation. Legisprudence, 6(2), pp.149-189. At p.153.
• Krippendorff, K., 1980. Validity in content analysis.
• Landman, T., 2002. Issues and methods in comparative politics: an introduction. Routledge. At p.25.
• Leavy, P. ed., 2014. The Oxford handbook of qualitative research. Oxford University Press, USA.
• Lijphart, A., 1971. Comparative politics and the comparative method. American political science review, 65(3), pp.682-693.
• Lijphart, A., 1989. Democratic political systems: Types, cases, causes, and consequences. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1(1), pp.33-48
• Linos, K., 2015. How to Select and Develop International Law Case Studies: Lessons from Comparative Law and Comparative Politics. American Journal of International Law, 109(3), pp.475-485.
• Lock, I. and Seele, P., 2018. Gauging the rigor of qualitative case studies in comparative lobbying research. A framework and guideline for research and analysis. Journal of Public Affairs, 18(4), p.e1832.
• Lodge, M., 2013. Semistructured interviews and informal institutions: Getting inside executive government. In Political science research methods in action (pp. 181-202). London: Palgrave Macmillan U
• Longhurst, R., 2003. Semi-structured interviews and focus groups. Key methods in geography, 3(2), pp.143-156. p.103.
• Mahoney, J., 2007. Qualitative methodology and comparative politics. Comparative political studies, 40(2), pp.122-144.
• Manheim, J.B., Rich, R.C., Willnat, L. and Brians, C.L., 2012. Empirical political analysis. Pearson Education UK.
• Mark Van Hoecke, ‘Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?’ in Mark Van Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of legal research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Hart 2011) 11.
• Marx, A., Rihoux, B. and Ragin, C., 2014. The origins, development, and application of Qualitative Comparative Analysis: the first 25 years. European Political Science Review, 6(1), pp.115-142.
• McLachlan, C., 2019. Five Conceptions of the Function of Foreign Relations Law. The Oxford handbook of comparative foreign relations law. Oxford Handbooks. At p.33.
• Ostrom, E., 1991. Rational choice theory and institutional analysis: Toward complementarity. American political science review, 85(1), pp.237-243.
• Randour, F., 2021. Studying the influence of national parliaments in EU affairs: reconnecting empirical research and the Principal-Agent approach. Political Research Exchange, 3(1), p.1989314.
• Ropret, M., Aristovnik, A. and Kovač, P., 2018. A Content analysis of the rule of law within public governance models: old vs. new EU member states. NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, 11(2), pp.129-152. At p.138.
• Salehijam, M., 2018. The value of systematic content analysis in legal research. Tilburg Law Review, 23(1-2), pp.34-42.
• Sartori, G., 1970. Concept misformation in comparative politics. American political science review, 64(4), pp.1033-1053.
• Smelser, N.J., 2013. Comparative methods in the social sciences. Quid Pro Books.
• Steinmo, S., Thelen, K. and Longstreth, F. eds., 1992. Structuring politics: historical institutionalism in comparative analysis. Cambridge University Press.
• Tsui, J. and Lucas, B., 2013. Methodologies for measuring influence. GSDRC Applied Knowledge Services prepared for DFID. UK, London.
• VanGestel, R. and Micklitz, H.W., 2011. Revitalizing Doctrinal Legal Research in Europe: What About Methodology?
• Vranken, J.B., 2010. Methodology of legal doctrinal research. In Methodologies of legal
• Zweigert, K. and Koetz, H., 1987. An Introduction to Comparative Law. Vol. II. 2d ed. Translated by T. Weir.
• Bryman, A., 2016. Social research methods. Oxford university press
• Caramani, D. 2017. Comparative politics. Oxford University Press.
• Chynoweth, P., 2008. Legal research. Advanced research methods in the built environment, 1. At p.29.
• Collier, D., 1991. The comparative method: Two decades of change. Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives, HarperCollins Publishers.
• De Dios, M.S., 2014, June. Different comparative approaches in the study of parliaments. In First Annual Conference of the ERASMUS Academic Network on Parliamentary Democracy in Europe (PADEMIA), Brussels(pp. 12-13).
• Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. eds., 2011. The Sage handbook of qualitative research. sage.
• Edwards, R. and Holland, J., 2013. What is qualitative interviewing? (p. 128). Bloomsbury Academic.
• Gawas, V.M., 2017. Doctrinal legal research method a guiding principle in reforming the law and legal system towards the research development.
• Gerring, J., 2017. Qualitative methods. Annual review of political science, 20(1), pp.15-36.Ginsburg, T. The Oxford handbook of comparative foreign relations law. Oxford Handbooks.
• Hall, M.A. and Wright, R.F., 2008. Systematic content analysis of judicial opinions. Calif. L. Rev., 96, p.63.
• Harris, B., 2015. Constitutional law guidebook. Oxford: Oxford University Press. At p.3.
• Hervey, T., Cryer, R., Sokhi-Bulley, B. and Bohm, A., 2011. Research methodologies in EU and international law. Bloomsbury Publishing. At p.28.
• Hofmann, H.C., 2020. Research Frameworks in Comparative Public Law: Law as Category, as Source and as Variable. University of Luxembourg Law Working Paper, (2020-013).
• Hutchinson, T. and Duncan, N., 2012. Defining and describing what we do: doctrinal legal research. Deakin law review, 17(1), pp.83-119.
• Karpen, U., 2012. Comparative law: perspectives of legislation. Legisprudence, 6(2), pp.149-189. At p.153.
• Krippendorff, K., 1980. Validity in content analysis.
• Landman, T., 2002. Issues and methods in comparative politics: an introduction. Routledge. At p.25.
• Leavy, P. ed., 2014. The Oxford handbook of qualitative research. Oxford University Press, USA.
• Lijphart, A., 1971. Comparative politics and the comparative method. American political science review, 65(3), pp.682-693.
• Lijphart, A., 1989. Democratic political systems: Types, cases, causes, and consequences. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1(1), pp.33-48
• Linos, K., 2015. How to Select and Develop International Law Case Studies: Lessons from Comparative Law and Comparative Politics. American Journal of International Law, 109(3), pp.475-485.
• Lock, I. and Seele, P., 2018. Gauging the rigor of qualitative case studies in comparative lobbying research. A framework and guideline for research and analysis. Journal of Public Affairs, 18(4), p.e1832.
• Lodge, M., 2013. Semistructured interviews and informal institutions: Getting inside executive government. In Political science research methods in action (pp. 181-202). London: Palgrave Macmillan U
• Longhurst, R., 2003. Semi-structured interviews and focus groups. Key methods in geography, 3(2), pp.143-156. p.103.
• Mahoney, J., 2007. Qualitative methodology and comparative politics. Comparative political studies, 40(2), pp.122-144.
• Manheim, J.B., Rich, R.C., Willnat, L. and Brians, C.L., 2012. Empirical political analysis. Pearson Education UK.
• Mark Van Hoecke, ‘Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?’ in Mark Van Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of legal research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Hart 2011) 11.
• Marx, A., Rihoux, B. and Ragin, C., 2014. The origins, development, and application of Qualitative Comparative Analysis: the first 25 years. European Political Science Review, 6(1), pp.115-142.
• McLachlan, C., 2019. Five Conceptions of the Function of Foreign Relations Law. The Oxford handbook of comparative foreign relations law. Oxford Handbooks. At p.33.
• Ostrom, E., 1991. Rational choice theory and institutional analysis: Toward complementarity. American political science review, 85(1), pp.237-243.
• Randour, F., 2021. Studying the influence of national parliaments in EU affairs: reconnecting empirical research and the Principal-Agent approach. Political Research Exchange, 3(1), p.1989314.
• Ropret, M., Aristovnik, A. and Kovač, P., 2018. A Content analysis of the rule of law within public governance models: old vs. new EU member states. NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, 11(2), pp.129-152. At p.138.
• Salehijam, M., 2018. The value of systematic content analysis in legal research. Tilburg Law Review, 23(1-2), pp.34-42.
• Sartori, G., 1970. Concept misformation in comparative politics. American political science review, 64(4), pp.1033-1053.
• Smelser, N.J., 2013. Comparative methods in the social sciences. Quid Pro Books.
• Steinmo, S., Thelen, K. and Longstreth, F. eds., 1992. Structuring politics: historical institutionalism in comparative analysis. Cambridge University Press.
• Tsui, J. and Lucas, B., 2013. Methodologies for measuring influence. GSDRC Applied Knowledge Services prepared for DFID. UK, London.
• VanGestel, R. and Micklitz, H.W., 2011. Revitalizing Doctrinal Legal Research in Europe: What About Methodology?
• Vranken, J.B., 2010. Methodology of legal doctrinal research. In Methodologies of legal
• Zweigert, K. and Koetz, H., 1987. An Introduction to Comparative Law. Vol. II. 2d ed. Translated by T. Weir.
Selected Case Studies
The selected case study for this research is the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). Recognized as the most far-reaching bilateral agreement concluded by the EU, CETA's negotiation process were characterized by a significant public mobilization and fragmentation of opinions on its reach by domestic parliaments. Indeed, as noted by De Bièvre CETA encompasses elements within member states' competencies, presenting a potential blockade threat and necessitating unanimous approval from all member states due to its classification as a “mixed trade agreement”. This dynamic underscored the importance of addressing domestic opposition proactively and adapting proposals to mitigate resistance coming from the different stakeholders involved. Consequently, CETA's democratic process underscores the enhanced role of national parliaments in its negotiations, conclusion and ratification. CETA entered into force provisionally on 21 September 2017. This followed its approval by EU Member States (MS), expressed in the Council, and by the European Parliament (EP). Nevertheless, today, more than five years later, this Trade Agreement has not fully entered into force since its ratification has still not been concluded by all the national parliaments of the European MS. Consequently, only the treaty’s provisions falling within the exclusive competence of the EU, 95 percent of CETA, could enjoy provisional application. This case study enriches the discourse on EU Trade Policy, offering insights into the interplay between legal frameworks, political legitimacy, and democratic processes in the context of European trade agreements. The CETA negotiation process, marked by significant sub-national actor engagement, provides a pertinent example for examining the intricacies of EU trade policy within the realms of International and Comparative Law and European Studies.
Key Findings (So Far)
The key findings so far can be summarized as follows:
1. Methodology: This research will examine the trade policymaking processes of the EU and Canada during the CETA negotiations and ratification, focusing on the roles of member states and provinces. It employs a comparative legal and political science approach to understand the nuances and differences between these entities. Drawing on Zweigert and Kötz's definition, the study views comparative law both as a method of intellectual activity focused on law and comparison, and as a distinct subject with its own methodologies. Ginsburg's approach to comparative constitutional perspective and foreign relations law will guide this analysis, aiming to explore the distribution of power, institutional variations, and the implications of these differences on trade agreement negotiations and implementations. Additionally, the research will incorporate a political comparative analysis, as described by Collier, to address methodological challenges in studying a limited number of cases. This multidisciplinary approach will facilitate a comprehensive examination of the legal frameworks within the EU and its member states, shedding light on their impact on trade agreement processes.
2. Hypothesis: So far, the main areas, which have brought upon this “crisis” of the European trade policy and an involvement, on this matter, of domestic parliaments, are the following: the constitutional and political frameworks in the EU Member States, the democratic deficit of the EU and the mounting parliamentary contestation/politicisation of EU’s trade policy and the differences in the understanding of liberal democracy between and within the member states. These findings allowed to structure my thesis around two main hypotheses related to these areas. The first hypothesis examines whether the influence of domestic parliaments over the European Union is dictated by "hard law," which in this thesis is referred to as legal influence, and by their national legal frameworks, which I have defined as legal reasons. My analysis will include both the national and subnational levels, in the case of federal member states. It will involve comparing the specified requirements of the four selected member states for acting within the EU Trade Policy, as well as analysing the national laws that enable them to influence the ratification or rejection of an EU trade agreement. This hypothesis suggests that the strength of national legal requirements on trade policy significantly influences a domestic parliament's impact on the EU’s trade agreement capabilities. This was identified so far through a literature review. The second hypothesis understanding the extent of the political reasons that make domestic parliaments assert their position in EU trade policy, thus influencing the EU’s ability to conclude trade agreements. The aim is to outline how political factors lead parliamentary bodies to leverage their domestic political influence to act at the EU level. This process can be explained through the lens of rational-choice institutionalism. According to this theory, following a rational-choice assumption that actors seek to maintain and increase their influence in the decision-making process, we can assume that national parliaments should seek influence in European decision-making, and its multi-level nature prompting them to attempt this at multiple levels, including the European level, to succeed in their goals. Based on what is outlined in the state of the art, in this thesis, I argue that the willingness of domestic parliaments to act is emphasized by the presence of parliamentary contestation. In this sense, I argue that parliamentary contestation can be an indication of a higher involvement on domestic parliaments in the EU decision making process, especially in trade policy. As acknowledged by Hurrelmann and Wendler, today, “there is broad agreement in the literature that increased public salience and contestation are key features of the new politics of trade observed in the EU”, and that this increased contestation, regarding the EU within both public opinion and party politics, has the potential to transform the functions of national parliaments.
1. Methodology: This research will examine the trade policymaking processes of the EU and Canada during the CETA negotiations and ratification, focusing on the roles of member states and provinces. It employs a comparative legal and political science approach to understand the nuances and differences between these entities. Drawing on Zweigert and Kötz's definition, the study views comparative law both as a method of intellectual activity focused on law and comparison, and as a distinct subject with its own methodologies. Ginsburg's approach to comparative constitutional perspective and foreign relations law will guide this analysis, aiming to explore the distribution of power, institutional variations, and the implications of these differences on trade agreement negotiations and implementations. Additionally, the research will incorporate a political comparative analysis, as described by Collier, to address methodological challenges in studying a limited number of cases. This multidisciplinary approach will facilitate a comprehensive examination of the legal frameworks within the EU and its member states, shedding light on their impact on trade agreement processes.
2. Hypothesis: So far, the main areas, which have brought upon this “crisis” of the European trade policy and an involvement, on this matter, of domestic parliaments, are the following: the constitutional and political frameworks in the EU Member States, the democratic deficit of the EU and the mounting parliamentary contestation/politicisation of EU’s trade policy and the differences in the understanding of liberal democracy between and within the member states. These findings allowed to structure my thesis around two main hypotheses related to these areas. The first hypothesis examines whether the influence of domestic parliaments over the European Union is dictated by "hard law," which in this thesis is referred to as legal influence, and by their national legal frameworks, which I have defined as legal reasons. My analysis will include both the national and subnational levels, in the case of federal member states. It will involve comparing the specified requirements of the four selected member states for acting within the EU Trade Policy, as well as analysing the national laws that enable them to influence the ratification or rejection of an EU trade agreement. This hypothesis suggests that the strength of national legal requirements on trade policy significantly influences a domestic parliament's impact on the EU’s trade agreement capabilities. This was identified so far through a literature review. The second hypothesis understanding the extent of the political reasons that make domestic parliaments assert their position in EU trade policy, thus influencing the EU’s ability to conclude trade agreements. The aim is to outline how political factors lead parliamentary bodies to leverage their domestic political influence to act at the EU level. This process can be explained through the lens of rational-choice institutionalism. According to this theory, following a rational-choice assumption that actors seek to maintain and increase their influence in the decision-making process, we can assume that national parliaments should seek influence in European decision-making, and its multi-level nature prompting them to attempt this at multiple levels, including the European level, to succeed in their goals. Based on what is outlined in the state of the art, in this thesis, I argue that the willingness of domestic parliaments to act is emphasized by the presence of parliamentary contestation. In this sense, I argue that parliamentary contestation can be an indication of a higher involvement on domestic parliaments in the EU decision making process, especially in trade policy. As acknowledged by Hurrelmann and Wendler, today, “there is broad agreement in the literature that increased public salience and contestation are key features of the new politics of trade observed in the EU”, and that this increased contestation, regarding the EU within both public opinion and party politics, has the potential to transform the functions of national parliaments.
Social Relevance of your Research
This thesis provides the first systematic, comparative legal–political analysis of how domestic, national and subnational parliaments affect the EU’s ability to conclude trade agreements. In particular, it addresses a major gap in the existing literature, which often explores EU trade policymaking from either a legal or a political perspective. Instead, by bridging these two approaches, the thesis aims to demonstrate why and how domestic parliaments, operating under national constitutional frameworks, can reshape EU trade decisions, especially under the conditions of “mixity” and dissensus exemplified by CETA. By applying a comparative legal analysis this thesis attempts to first illustrate the constitutional provisions and domestic legal bases that empower parliaments to intervene in external treaty‐making. Secondly, by using rational choice institutionalism and the multi‐level governance theory, this thesis aims to explain why and when parliaments would choose to exercise those legal powers. Whereas much of the literature focuses on EU competence controversies or on the influence of interest groups, few studies systematically show how parliaments utilize both formal constitutional tools and political leverage to constrain or change the outcome of trade negotiations. By combining legal frameworks and political incentives, this research aims to address this gap by analysing if national constitutional strength (legal reasons) and domestic parliamentary contestation (political reasons) can indeed influence the EU’s decision-making, and more specifically the EU’s ability to conclude trade agreements. More specifically, the analysis will focus, first, on assessing the impact of national constitutional law, governing trade agreements, on the role of domestic parliaments in EU trade policy. It aims to understand the complexities of how these parliamentary bodies leverage their national law to affect the EU’s ability to conclude trade agreements. Furthermore, it also assesses if this influence happens when domestic parliaments have a sense of ownership over the trade policy-making process within the EU. In this sense, as indicated above, the role of salience or politisation is not to be underestimated. Indeed, as concluded by Winzen, government-supporting groups respond to the salience of EU decision-making by increasingly acting at the EU level. Addtionally, following the political science literature parliamentary influence can be identified by the presence of certain criteria. These include public and party Euroscepticism, frequent minority governments, and at least one party that prefers policy veto over government participation as the necessary and sufficient conditions for parliamentary control. In addition to these criteria, we also argue that whenever domestic parliaments perceive that an EU policy process does not adhere to the value of the Rule of Law, they will be more inclined to intervene at the EU level to ensure that this fundamental value is respected increasing the democratic legitimacy of EU decision-making, even if this can limit the EU’s ability to legislate in the matter.
In this context, numerous publications recognize that national parliaments possess scrutiny instruments , yet the question of how they shape EU‐level decisions in practice remains largely underexplored. This thesis attempts to show parliamentary influence by firstly understanding how and why parliamentary action happens through an analysis of national constitutional legal and political perspectives, and then explaining why parliaments intervene under certain conditions, citing rational incentive structures and high contestation. Finally demonstrating what real constraints parliaments place on EU negotiators, thus altering the EU’s. The novelty of this research comes from the fact that parliaments are not treated as merely passive or symbolic actors in EU trade policy, but as important actors, especially under “mixed” treaty procedures. Indeed, this goes against the prevailing view in the literature that states that the Lisbon Treaty was widely seen to strengthen the European Parliament at the expense of national legislatures. More specifically, this thesis challenges the assumption that national parliaments have become irrelevant in external EU policy. In this sense, I argue that high levels of public contestation create domestic electoral incentives for MPs to use ratification prerogatives strategically. More specifically, this thesis argues that domestic parliaments, as rational actors, engage in the EU multi‐level system to maximize electoral or political gains . In this context, the innovation of rational choice institutionalism lies in its emphasis on analysing how institutions impact and influence decisions, specifically in determining which interests or preferences prevail in the policymaking process. By combining MLG and rational choice offers a unified model of how vertical “shifts”, from the EU to the regional level, reflect both legal rule structures and political strategies. Furthermore, by analysing different MS and applying this legal and political comparative approach this thesis attempts to uncover generalizable patterns of parliamentary activism.
Other novel aspect of this thesis is its revisiting of the democratic deficit debates through the lens of domestic parliaments. Indeed, many discussions of the EU’s democratic deficit emphasize the EP or the role of civil society organisations’ consultation. However, the contribution of domestic legislatures to EU legitimacy has been neglected. This thesis will indicate that domestic parliamentary involvement can also bolster “input legitimacy” by offering direct representation of national electorates. Furthermore, based on the work of Brack and Costa, this thesis indicates that democratic accountability is enhanced when parliaments stage public deliberations. This thesis argues for seeing parliamentary involvement not merely as a “procedural obstacle” but as an integral source of democracy. Overall, the main objective of the thesis is to create a framework to explain causation, variation and implication of the involvement of domestic parliaments in EU trade policy. Causation explains how the presence of formal constitutional powers plus political mobilization leads parliaments to influence EU trade agreements’ negotiations and implantation. Variation explains why some parliaments become major players, such as Wallonia, while others remain reticent or do not use their constitutional powers. And finally, implication explains how these parliamentary interventions affect not just CETA, but the broader trajectory of EU trade policy and the EU’s ability to conclude trade agreements.
In sum, the thesis’s central novelty lies in offering an interdisciplinary, comparative study that integrates legal scholarship with rational choice and MLG based insights to understand the role of domestic parliaments in the EU. By systematically documenting these through the CETA case, and comparing across multiple Member States, this thesis aims to fill gaps in the literature of EU trade policy. It advances the literatures on EU external relations law, comparative foreign relations law, the role of domestic parliaments in the EU, and broader discussions about the EU’s legitimacy.
In this context, numerous publications recognize that national parliaments possess scrutiny instruments , yet the question of how they shape EU‐level decisions in practice remains largely underexplored. This thesis attempts to show parliamentary influence by firstly understanding how and why parliamentary action happens through an analysis of national constitutional legal and political perspectives, and then explaining why parliaments intervene under certain conditions, citing rational incentive structures and high contestation. Finally demonstrating what real constraints parliaments place on EU negotiators, thus altering the EU’s. The novelty of this research comes from the fact that parliaments are not treated as merely passive or symbolic actors in EU trade policy, but as important actors, especially under “mixed” treaty procedures. Indeed, this goes against the prevailing view in the literature that states that the Lisbon Treaty was widely seen to strengthen the European Parliament at the expense of national legislatures. More specifically, this thesis challenges the assumption that national parliaments have become irrelevant in external EU policy. In this sense, I argue that high levels of public contestation create domestic electoral incentives for MPs to use ratification prerogatives strategically. More specifically, this thesis argues that domestic parliaments, as rational actors, engage in the EU multi‐level system to maximize electoral or political gains . In this context, the innovation of rational choice institutionalism lies in its emphasis on analysing how institutions impact and influence decisions, specifically in determining which interests or preferences prevail in the policymaking process. By combining MLG and rational choice offers a unified model of how vertical “shifts”, from the EU to the regional level, reflect both legal rule structures and political strategies. Furthermore, by analysing different MS and applying this legal and political comparative approach this thesis attempts to uncover generalizable patterns of parliamentary activism.
Other novel aspect of this thesis is its revisiting of the democratic deficit debates through the lens of domestic parliaments. Indeed, many discussions of the EU’s democratic deficit emphasize the EP or the role of civil society organisations’ consultation. However, the contribution of domestic legislatures to EU legitimacy has been neglected. This thesis will indicate that domestic parliamentary involvement can also bolster “input legitimacy” by offering direct representation of national electorates. Furthermore, based on the work of Brack and Costa, this thesis indicates that democratic accountability is enhanced when parliaments stage public deliberations. This thesis argues for seeing parliamentary involvement not merely as a “procedural obstacle” but as an integral source of democracy. Overall, the main objective of the thesis is to create a framework to explain causation, variation and implication of the involvement of domestic parliaments in EU trade policy. Causation explains how the presence of formal constitutional powers plus political mobilization leads parliaments to influence EU trade agreements’ negotiations and implantation. Variation explains why some parliaments become major players, such as Wallonia, while others remain reticent or do not use their constitutional powers. And finally, implication explains how these parliamentary interventions affect not just CETA, but the broader trajectory of EU trade policy and the EU’s ability to conclude trade agreements.
In sum, the thesis’s central novelty lies in offering an interdisciplinary, comparative study that integrates legal scholarship with rational choice and MLG based insights to understand the role of domestic parliaments in the EU. By systematically documenting these through the CETA case, and comparing across multiple Member States, this thesis aims to fill gaps in the literature of EU trade policy. It advances the literatures on EU external relations law, comparative foreign relations law, the role of domestic parliaments in the EU, and broader discussions about the EU’s legitimacy.
Samir conducts a doctoral research at Luiss University of Rome, Université Laval, and the Université libre de Bruxelles within the Horizon Europe GEM-DIAMOND project (Globalisation, Europe, and Multilateralism - Democratic Institutions, the Rise of Alternative Models and Mounting Normative Dissensus). His research project, supervised by Cristina Fasone (LUISS), Richard Ouellet (Laval University) and Nathalie Brack (ULB), examines how and to what extent parliaments affect the EU's ability to conclude trade agreements. This thesis will also assess how differences in the national legal requirements on trade policy and in the understanding of liberal democracy paved the way to democratic conflicts within the parliaments and the legal systems involved.
Samir holds an MA in European Affairs from the Institute of European Studies of the ULB and BA in Political Sciences from the ULB. Before starting his PhD journey, Samir worked as financial product developer in Luxembourg.
Currently, he is also a researcher at the Chair on New Challenges of Economic Globalization (ULaval), at the Research Cluster on European Integration and Public Policies (LUISS) and at the Center for the Study of Politics (ULB).
Samir holds an MA in European Affairs from the Institute of European Studies of the ULB and BA in Political Sciences from the ULB. Before starting his PhD journey, Samir worked as financial product developer in Luxembourg.
Currently, he is also a researcher at the Chair on New Challenges of Economic Globalization (ULaval), at the Research Cluster on European Integration and Public Policies (LUISS) and at the Center for the Study of Politics (ULB).
Courses
• Philosophy of social science (LUISS University)
• Theory in Political Science I: Democracy and representation (LUISS University)
• Quantitative Methods (LUISS University)
• Research Design in Politics (LUISS University)
• Research Design in Law (LUISS University)
• Legal writing (LUISS University)
• Qualitative Methods (LUISS University)
• Alternative Justice and Pretrial Sentencing (LUISS University)
• Multilevel Regulation in public policy (LUISS University)
• Market and competition (LUISS University)
• Directed readings in Law (Université Laval)
• Directed readings in Political Science (Université Laval)
Seminars
• DiSP Young Resarchers’ Seminar Series (LUISS Univesity)
• Political Science Department’s Seminar Series (LUISS Univesity)
Summar Schools
• Summer Program: Parliamentary Democracy in Europe 12th Edition: “Parliaments in front of the multiple crises: From global to local”, 2023, LUISS, Rome, Italy.
• Gem-Diamond Summer School, 2024. Brussels, Belgium.
• Gem-Diamond Autumn School, 2024, Brussels, Belgium.
Academic conferences
• Presentation at the European in International Affairs Conference (EUIA). 2023. Brussels, Belgium.
• Presentation at the LUISS Graduate's Conference, 2023. Rome, Italy.
• Presentation at the The Governance of Digital Trade: Crossroads of Divergent Approaches. 2023. Foreign Trade Univerity, Hanoi, Vietnam.
Publications (so far)
• El Khanza, Samir (2025). The global governance of digital trade: just another Brussels effect?. In La gouvernance du commerce numérique: regards croisés sur des approches différentes. Presses de l’Université Laval. [forthcoming]
• El Khanza, Samir (2025). From dissensus to change: The Evolution of EU Trade Policy in the Wake of CETA. In Ramona Coman, Frederik Ponjaert & Nicholas Levrat (eds.) Dissensus over liberal democracy: actors, policies, and institutions. Routledge [forthcoming]
• El Khanza, Samir & Radaelli, Claudio (2025). The Policy Impact of Social Sciences. In Ramona Coman, Frederik Ponjaert & David Paternotte (eds.). Impact and Social Sciences: A Conceptual Index. Oxford University Press. [forthcoming]
Memberships
• Chair on New Challenges of Economic Globalization, Université Laval.
• Centre d’Etude de la Vie Politique (Cevipol), Université Libre de Bruxelles.
• Centre interdisciplinaire de recherche sur la gouvernance mondiale (CIRGoM), Université Laval.
• Chair on New Challenges of Economic Globalization, Université Laval.
• Philosophy of social science (LUISS University)
• Theory in Political Science I: Democracy and representation (LUISS University)
• Quantitative Methods (LUISS University)
• Research Design in Politics (LUISS University)
• Research Design in Law (LUISS University)
• Legal writing (LUISS University)
• Qualitative Methods (LUISS University)
• Alternative Justice and Pretrial Sentencing (LUISS University)
• Multilevel Regulation in public policy (LUISS University)
• Market and competition (LUISS University)
• Directed readings in Law (Université Laval)
• Directed readings in Political Science (Université Laval)
Seminars
• DiSP Young Resarchers’ Seminar Series (LUISS Univesity)
• Political Science Department’s Seminar Series (LUISS Univesity)
Summar Schools
• Summer Program: Parliamentary Democracy in Europe 12th Edition: “Parliaments in front of the multiple crises: From global to local”, 2023, LUISS, Rome, Italy.
• Gem-Diamond Summer School, 2024. Brussels, Belgium.
• Gem-Diamond Autumn School, 2024, Brussels, Belgium.
Academic conferences
• Presentation at the European in International Affairs Conference (EUIA). 2023. Brussels, Belgium.
• Presentation at the LUISS Graduate's Conference, 2023. Rome, Italy.
• Presentation at the The Governance of Digital Trade: Crossroads of Divergent Approaches. 2023. Foreign Trade Univerity, Hanoi, Vietnam.
Publications (so far)
• El Khanza, Samir (2025). The global governance of digital trade: just another Brussels effect?. In La gouvernance du commerce numérique: regards croisés sur des approches différentes. Presses de l’Université Laval. [forthcoming]
• El Khanza, Samir (2025). From dissensus to change: The Evolution of EU Trade Policy in the Wake of CETA. In Ramona Coman, Frederik Ponjaert & Nicholas Levrat (eds.) Dissensus over liberal democracy: actors, policies, and institutions. Routledge [forthcoming]
• El Khanza, Samir & Radaelli, Claudio (2025). The Policy Impact of Social Sciences. In Ramona Coman, Frederik Ponjaert & David Paternotte (eds.). Impact and Social Sciences: A Conceptual Index. Oxford University Press. [forthcoming]
Memberships
• Chair on New Challenges of Economic Globalization, Université Laval.
• Centre d’Etude de la Vie Politique (Cevipol), Université Libre de Bruxelles.
• Centre interdisciplinaire de recherche sur la gouvernance mondiale (CIRGoM), Université Laval.
• Chair on New Challenges of Economic Globalization, Université Laval.
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Navigating the Ph.D. Journey: A comparison between Italy and Canada From LUISS to Laval
28 March 2024
Starting a Ph.D. journey is an important step, yet the experience can vary depending on the geographic or institutional context of such an academic journey
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From Academia to Adventure: Unpacking the Hanoi Conference on "The Governance of Digital Trade: crossroads of different approaches."
23 February 2024
Samir El Khanza's journey through Digital Governance and Cultural Discovery
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Exploring Parliaments in front of the multiple crises
22 November 2023
My Summer School Experience in Rome
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The 2nd Interdisciplinary Methods Workshop hosted in Copenhagen
27 June 2023
The GEM Fellows have reunited in Copenhagen to attend an Interdisciplinary Methods Workshop, organised by the iCourts at the Faculty of Law in Copenhagen.
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Birth of the GEM-DIAMOND Fellowship of the Ph.D.
1 October 2022
16 MSCA Fellows successfully selected following a gruelling selection process.